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Research Paper no. 8/07 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND  
BUSINESS OWNERSHIP REVISITED 
Abstract 
This paper revisits the two-equation model of Carree, van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers 
(2002) where deviations from the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership play a 
central role determining both the growth of business ownership and that of economic 
development. Two extensions of the original setup are addressed: using longer time 
series of averaged data of 23 OECD countries (up to 2004) we can discriminate 
between different functional forms of the ‘equilibrium’ rate and we allow for different 
penalties for being above or under the ‘equilibrium’ rate. The additional data do not 
provide evidence of a superior statistical fit of a U-shaped ‘equilibrium’ relationship 
when compared to an L-shaped one. There appears to be a growth penalty for having 
too few business owners but not so for having too many.  
Keywords:  entrepreneurship, economic development, economic growth, business 
ownership   
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1.   Introduction 
The empirical investigation of the relationship between business ownership rates and 
economic development has been dominated by three stylized facts. First, the rate 
differs strongly across countries. Figure 1 (left bars) shows that the business 
ownership rate in 2004 in the G7 nations range from 8% in France to 19% in Italy. 
Van Stel (2005) demonstrates similar differences across the 23 OECD countries over 
a long recent period. The business ownership rate is expressed as the percentage of 
(non-agricultural) owner/managers of incorporated and unincorporated businesses 
relative to the labour force. Second, the negative relationship between the business 
ownership rate and economic development is well documented. Examples include 
Kuznets (1971), Schultz (1990), Yamada (1996) and Iyigun and Owen (1998). 
Particularly the first two-thirds of the 20th century witnessed a move towards 
industrial centralization and concentration fuelled by the pervasiveness of economies 
of scale (Chandler, 1990, and Teece, 1993). Third, a reversal of this trend appears in 
the later part of the last century driven mainly by a reduction of the importance of 
scale economies. This reversal is first documented by Blau (1987) and Acs, Audretsch 
and Evans (1994) while other conceptual explanations are given by Piore and Sable 
(1984), Jensen (1993), as well as Audretsch and Thurik (2001 and 2004).  
Modelling the relationship between the business ownership rate and economic 
development is complex because there are several mechanisms at play (Thurik, 
Carree, van Stel and Audretsch, 2007). Low levels of economic development may 
push people towards self-employment. However, these low levels may also go 
together with a limited amount of market opportunities and a lack of personal wealth 
needed to set up shop (Verheul, van Stel and Thurik 2006). On the other hand, 
increased business ownership activity may increase the level of economic 
development. This ‘Schumpeterian’ effect, however, depends on the level of 
economic development (van Stel, Carree and Thurik 2005). 
Carree, van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002) try to bring together stylized facts and 
causalities introducing a two-equation model where the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business 
ownership plays a central role. Deviations from this rate determine both the growth of 
business ownership and the pace of economic development. This set up enables to 
investigate the shape of the ‘equilibrium’ rate (U-shaped or L-shaped), the speed of 
convergence towards this rate (the error correcting mechanism) and the ‘out-of-
equilibrium’ growth penalty (see also Audretsch, Carree, van Stel and Thurik, 2002).  
This two-equation model inspired others to do similar investigations. For instance, the 
concept of the ‘U-shape’ is used for Latin American countries in Amorós (2006) 
while Belso Martinez (2005) uses the two-equation model to study the interplay 
between business ownership and economic development in Spanish regions. The 
latter paper however lacks proper referencing to the two-equation model and suffers 
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from some flaws.
1
 The concept of the ‘U-shape’ is also tested in Wennekers, van Stel, 
Thurik and Reynolds (2005) using nascent entrepreneurship data in stead of business 
ownership data. 
The present paper extends the two-equation model and the earlier results in the 
following ways. First, the use of longer time series provides a better view of the shape 
of the ‘equilibrium’ rate. Two obvious candidates still are the U-shape and L-shape 
both inspired by the third of the above mentioned stylized facts. Second, the 
symmetry of the growth penalty is studied in the sense that too few or too many 
businesses need not necessarily lead to the same growth penalty. 
The main conclusions of the present paper are that (i) the additional, more recent data 
do not provide evidence of a superior statistical fit of a U-shaped ‘equilibrium’ 
relationship when compared to an L-shape; (ii) there appears to be a growth penalty 
for having too few business owners but none for having too many. The next section 
presents the model. The variables are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the 
estimation results while section 5 provides a short discussion on country-specific 
institutional factors. 
2. The model 
Carree, van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002) introduced a model of the 
interrelationship between business ownership and economic development at the 
country level. The model consists of two equations. The first equation explains 
changes in the rate of business ownership from an error-correction process towards 
‘equilibrium’ rates. The second equation determines the growth penalty of the rate of 
business ownership being ‘out-of-equilibrium’. A third equation acts as a definition 
and describes the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership as a function of economic 
development. The subscripts i and t are used for countries and years, respectively. 
Equation (1) relates the change in the rate of business ownership itE  to the extent in 
which this rate deviates from the ‘equilibrium’ rate *itE , to which the unemployment 
rate itU  deviates from the sample average unemployment rate and to which the labour 
income share itLIQ  deviates from the sample average income share. Equation (2) 
predicts economic growth from the (absolute) deviation of the actual business 
ownership rate from the ‘equilibrium’ rate. It is hypothesized that strong deviations 
from the ‘equilibrium’ rate leads to reduced economic growth (the growth penalty). 
                                                           
1 In particular, the author uses data only from a four-year period (1998-2002). Since the economic 
relations investigated in the two-equation model are intrinsically of a long-term nature (e.g. the speed 
of convergence towards equilibrium), the database is not suitable for estimating this type of model. 
Accordingly, it is not clear how the Belso Martinez estimations should be interpreted. In the present 
paper we use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1972-2004. 
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Equation (2a) has a symmetric penalty for being below or above the ‘equilibrium’ 
rate. Equation (2b) allows for this penalty to differ between below and above 
‘equilibrium’ situations. Catching-up effects are included in this equation using the 
(preceding) level of economic development. Following Carree, van Stel, Thurik and 
Wennekers (2002) economic growth is the relative change of 
itYCAP , the per capita 
gross domestic product in purchasing power parities per U.S. dollar in 1990 prices. 
Equation (3) describes the ‘equilibrium’ relationship2 between business ownership 
rates and economic development ( itYCAP ) as either U-shaped (3a) or L-shaped (3b). 
In the quadratic form, entrepreneurship declines with per capita income up till a 
minimum (when itYCAP  equals γβ 2/− ) after which entrepreneurship increases with 
per capita income. In the inverse function, entrepreneurship gradually declines 
towards an asymptotic minimum value (of βα − ). In the first two equations the 
following notation is used: 44 −−=∆ ttt XXX . The model reads as follows: 
(1)   ( ) ( ) ( ) itITAITAtitititiit DbLIQLIQbUUbEEbE 16,36,24,* 4,14 ε++−+−+−=∆ −−−−   ; 
(2a) ittititi
ti
it YCAPcEEcc
YCAP
YCAP
24,24,
*
4,10
4,
4 ε++−+=
∆
−−−
−
  ; 
(2b) 
ittitititiovershootundershoot
tititiovershootovershoot
ti
it
YCAPcEEDc
EEDcc
YCAP
YCAP
24,24,
*
4,4,,,1
4,
*
4,4,,,10
4,
4
)1( ε++−−
+−+=
∆
−−−−
−−−
−   ; 
(3a) 
2*
ititit YCAPYCAPE γβα ++=   ; 
(3b) 
1
*
+
−=
it
it
it
YCAP
YCAP
E βα   , 
where 
E:  number of business owners per labour force, 
E*:  ‘equilibrium’ number of business owners per labour force, 
YCAP:  per capita GDP in thousands of purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 
1990 prices, 
U, U :  unemployment rate and sample average, respectively, 
                                                           
2
 The term ‘equilibrium’ is consistently put between quotes throughout this paper as it refers to an 
optimum or a norm rather than that it is derived from a regular demand and supply configuration. Note 
that the 'equilibrium' variable is latent. 
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LIQ, LIQ : labour income share and sample average, respectively, 
DITA:  dummy variable with value 1 for Italy, and 0 for other countries, 
Dovershoot: dummy variable with value 1 if E is higher than E*, and 0 otherwise, 
21,εε :  uncorrelated disturbance terms of equations (1) and (2), respectively, 
i, t:  indices for country and year, respectively. 
Business ownership equation (1) 
The variable to be explained in equation (1) is the growth in the number of business 
owners per labour force in a four-year period. The parameter b1 reflects the speed of 
an error correction mechanism between the ‘equilibrium’ and the actual rate of 
business ownership at the start of the period and is expected to have a positive sign. 
The parameter b2 represents the influence of lagged unemployment acting as a push 
factor for business ownership and its expected sign is positive. We choose a lag of six 
years instead of four for this variable because mental preparation, practical procedures 
and legal requirements are involved in starting a new enterprise. The parameter b3 
represents the influence of the labour income share and its expected sign is negative. 
This share is a proxy for the earning differentials between expected profits of business 
owners and wage earnings. We assume that a relatively high business profitability (as 
compared to wage earnings) acts as a pull factor for business ownership. The labour 
income share is defined as the share of labour income (including the “calculated” 
compensation of the self-employed for their labour contribution) in the gross national 
income. As with the unemployment variable, a time lag has been included. Finally, 
we follow Carree, van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002) incorporating a dummy for 
Italy. Italy, and Northern Italy in particular, is exceptional in the sense that a relatively 
high value of GDP per capita is combined with a high and rising self-employment 
rate. Belussi (1998) and Muehlberger and Pasqua (2006) describe how the important 
phenomenon of ‘continuous and coordinated collaborators’ in Italy contributes to the 
high self-employment rate in Italy. Belussi (1998) also describes how governmental 
policies in Italy (at the local, regional and national level) have been very favourable to 
artisan production and self-employment, claiming that support programmes for self-
employment amount up to almost 2% of Italian GDP.  
Economic growth equations (2a) and (2b) 
The variable to be explained in equations (2a) and (2b) is economic growth measured 
as the relative change in gross domestic product per capita in a four-year period. The 
parameter c1 represents the influence of the (absolute) deviation of the actual rate of 
self-employment (business ownership) from the ‘equilibrium’ rate of business 
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ownership at the start of the period. This deviation is expected to have a negative 
impact on subsequent growth: c1<0. We also investigate whether the growth penalty is 
different in situations of ‘undershooting’ (the actual number of business owners is 
lower than the ‘equilibrium’ number) or ‘overshooting’ (the actual number of 
business owners is higher than the ‘equilibrium’ number). See equation (2b). The 
parameter c2 measures the impact of the level of per capita income at the start of the 
period. This variable allows for correcting for the convergence hypothesis: countries 
lagging behind in economic development grow more easily because they can profit 
from technologies developed in other countries. The expected sign of the parameter c2 
is negative. 
3. The variables 
Data are used from the 23 OECD countries (the former EU-15, Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the US) and for the even 
years in the period 1972 through 2004. OECD Labour Force Statistics and the OECD 
National Account are the main data sources. Our sample consists of four-yearly data. 
Data for the years 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 are used. The total 
number of observations equals 161 (instead of the 115 in Carree, van Stel, Thurik and 
Wennekers, 2002). We do not use data for the other even years, such as 1982, 1986, 
etc., because the observation periods for two consecutive even years overlap. This 
may lead to a downward bias in the estimated standard errors of the parameters. 
3.1. Variables and sources 
The definition and the main source of the variables are as follows: 
E:  Business ownership (or self-employment). It is defined as the number 
of business owners (in all sectors excluding the agricultural sector), expressed as a 
fraction of the labour force. Business owners include unincorporated and incorporated 
self-employed individuals but exclude unpaid family workers. Data on business 
ownership are taken from EIM’s COMPENDIA data base (available through 
www.eim.net). In COMPENDIA numbers of self-employed reported in OECD 
Labour Force Statistics are harmonized across countries and over time. In the present 
paper version 2004.2 of the COMPENDIA data base is used. See van Stel (2005) for 
an account of how an earlier version of this data set is put together. Data on total 
labour force are from OECD Labour Force Statistics; 
YCAP:  Gross domestic product per capita. The variables gross domestic 
product and total population are taken from OECD National Accounts and OECD 
Labour Force Statistics, respectively. GDP (in thousands of US $) is measured in 
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constant prices. Furthermore, purchasing power parities of 1990 are used to make the 
monetary units comparable between countries; 
U:  Unemployment rate. It is measured as the number of unemployed as a 
fraction of the total labour force. The labour force consists of employees, self-
employed persons, unpaid family workers, people employed by the armed forces and 
unemployed persons. The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic 
Indicators; 
LIQ:  Labour income share. Total compensation of employees is multiplied 
by (total employment/number of employees) to correct for the imputed wage income 
for the self-employed persons. Next, the number obtained is divided by total income 
(compensation of employees plus gross operating surplus and gross mixed income). 
The data of these variables are from OECD National Accounts. 
4. Estimation results 
Substituting equations (3a) and (3b) into equation (1) we obtain: 
(4a) 
itITAITAtititititiit DbYCAPaYCAPaLIQbUbEbaE 1
2
4,54,46,36,24,104 ε++++++−=∆ −−−−−   ; 
(4b) itITAITA
it
it
tititiit Db
YCAP
YCAP
aLIQbUbEbaE 1
4
4
46,36,24,104
1
ε++
+
+++−=∆
−
−
−−−   . 
A weighted estimating procedure is used as we consider large countries such as the 
U.S. and Japan to be more important in establishing the interrelationship between 
business ownership and economic growth than small countries. For a detailed 
description of this weighting procedure using population numbers we refer to Carree, 
Van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002). We apply weighted least squares to the 
equations and then find estimates for the ‘equilibrium’ rate parameters using the 
following three, respectively two, expressions: 
(5a) 15141320 b/aˆb/a
ˆb/)LIQbUba(ˆ ==++= γβα   , 
(5b) )/(ˆ/)(ˆ 141320 babLIQbUba −=++= βα   . 
These parameters are substituted into equations (3a) and (3b) so as to calculate E*. 
This variable is incorporated in equation (2). This equation is then also estimated 
using (weighted) least squares. The estimation results are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Estimation results of equations (4a), (4b), (2a) and (2b) 
 Quadratic ‘equilibrium rate’:  
equation (3a) 
Inverse ‘equilibrium’ rate:  
equation (3b) 
equations (4a) and (4b), dependent variable: four-year growth of business ownership rate 
0a  autonomous 
effect 
0.061 *** 
(3.8) 
0.183 *** 
(4.4) 
1b  error 
correction 
0.132 *** 
(5.2) 
0.135 *** 
(5.3) 
2b  unemployment 0.030 * 
(1.8) 
0.033 ** 
(2.1) 
3b  labour income 
share 
-0.044 ** 
(2.4) 
-0.037 ** 
(2.2) 
4a  per capita 
GDP 
-0.0014 * 
(1.9) 
-0.153 *** 
(4.3) 
5a  per capita 
GDP 
0.000024 
(1.1) 
 
ITAb  Italy 0.014 *** 
(5.2) 
0.014 *** 
(5.3) 
α  (3a) and (3b) 0.244 *** 
(5.0) 
1.180 *** 
(4.6) 
β  (3a) and (3b) -0.011 * 
(1.9) 
1.133 *** 
(4.2) 
γ  (3a) and (3b) 0.00018 
(1.1) 
 
Minimum 0.082  
Asymptote  0.047 
2
adj
R  0.222 0.223 
equations (2a) and (2b), dependent variable: four-year growth of GDP per capita 
 equation (2a) equation (2b) 
 
equation (2a) equation (2b) 
0c  autonomous 
effect 
0.142 *** 
(7.7) 
0.149 *** 
(7.5) 
0.144 *** 
(7.8) 
0.152 *** 
(7.7) 
1c  out of 
equilibrium 
-0.305 
(1.6) 
 -0.343 * 
(1.7) 
 
overshootc ,1  out of 
equilibrium 
 -0.159 
(0.6) 
 -0.177 
(0.7) 
undershootc ,1  out of 
equilibrium 
 -0.416 * 
(1.8) 
 -0.496 ** 
(2.1) 
2c  convergence -0.0034 *** 
(3.7) 
-0.0038 *** 
(3.7) 
-0.0035 *** 
(3.8) 
-0.0039 *** 
(4.0) 
2
adjR  0.499 0.499 0.501 0.502 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. * Significant at 0.10 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** 
Significant at 0.01 level. The number of observations is 161. 
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The results in the top part of the table show that there is very little difference in 
statistical fit between a U-shape and an L-shaped ‘equilibrium’ relationship. The 
adjusted R-square are 0.222 and 0.223, respectively. Despite the lack of difference in 
statistical fit, the implications of the two ‘equilibrium’ functions differ substantially. 
The U-shaped ‘equilibrium’ relationship has a minimum business ownership rate of 
8.2% while the L-shaped one is declining to a asymptotic value of 4.7%. The speed of 
error-correction (measured by b1) is about 13% for a four-year period. There appears 
to be a small unemployment push effect: b2 is significantly positive. The labour 
income quote (LIQ) has, as expected, a significant negative effect: lack of profit 
opportunities decreases the tendency to be self-employed and owning a business. The 
dummy effect for Italy is strongly significant and even stronger than in Carree, van 
Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002) showing an even increased deviation of Italy from 
the general tendencies in the development of OECD business ownership data. Figure 
2 shows the estimated L-shaped 'equilibrium' rate in combination with actual data for 
the G7-countries. 
The results in the bottom part of the table indicate that there may not be a growth 
penalty for the business ownership rate being in excess of the ‘equilibrium’ rate. It 
may come as a surprise that for example Italy, being far above the ‘equilibrium’ rate 
(see Figure 1 and 2), would not suffer in terms of economic performance. Belussi 
(1998), however, stresses that the high level of self-employment in Italy should not be 
seen per se as positive or negative as in a typical Italian firm one can find very 
different contractual arrangements for the same type of task. For the business 
ownership being below its ‘equilibrium’ rate, there appears to be a significant 
negative effect on economic growth. 
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Figure 1. The actual and ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership for G7-
countries, 2004. 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
FRA JAP GER US UK CAN ITA
E
E*
Note: ‘equilibrium’ rate data (E*) based on L-shape (inverse 'equilibrium' rate).  
Source: COMPENDIA 2004.2 and own calculations. 
 
Figure 2. The actual and ‘equilibrium’ rate of business ownership for G7-
countries, 1972-2004, and per capita GDP (ppp per 1990 US $). 
Equilibrium rate
UK
JAP
GER
FRA
CAN
US
ITA
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
9000 14000 19000 24000 29000
YCAP
E
Note: ‘equilibrium’ rate data based on L-shape (inverse 'equilibrium' rate).  
Source: COMPENDIA 2004.2 and own calculations. 
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5. Discussion 
In this last section we address three questions. The first question concerns the new 
evidence our longer time series provides regarding the shape of the ‘equilibrium’ 
relation. While the statistical fit of a U-shape and an L-shape is almost equal, the two 
relations differ strongly in their future implications. The U-shape predicts a future 
increase of the ‘equilibrium’ rate while the L-shape foretells a gradual bottoming out 
towards a historically low level of ‘equilibrium’ business ownership around 5%. 
However, there is no obvious support in the sample data for either an upswing of the 
‘equilibrium’ rate or for a continued decline. 
The second question concerns the patterns of the actual business ownership rates 
across countries, and of their deviations from the ‘equilibrium’ rate. Which 
determinants, apart from the level of economic development, helps to explain these 
patterns? The literature suggests that demographic, cultural and institutional factors 
may be at play (Wennekers, 2006; Grilo and Irigoyen, 2006; Freytag and Thurik, 
2007). Within our sample of OECD countries, several groups may be distinguished. 
First, all Scandinavian countries except Iceland have a low rate of business ownership 
(below 8.5% in 2004). These countries also share several characteristics associated 
with lower business ownership rates, including a high per capita income, high female 
labour participation rates, a low degree of income inequality and a large public sector 
(Henrekson, 2005; Wennekers, 2006). In contrast, the Mediterranean countries in our 
sample (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) are among the nations with the highest 
business ownership rate (in excess of 12.5% in 2004). For Greece, Portugal and 
Spain, a relatively low per capita income rate and relatively high life dissatisfaction 
rates have been associated with higher self-employment (Noorderhaven, Thurik, 
Wennekers and van Stel, 2004). Italy is characterized by a low per capita income in 
Southern Italy (the Mezzogiorno) and a unique industrial structure in Northern Italy 
based on industrial districts and an emphasis on small family businesses. Third, the 
Anglo-Saxon countries have fairly high business ownership rates, and in recent years 
they all seem to be above ‘equilibrium’. These countries share several cultural and 
institutional characteristics, such as high individualism, low social security 
expenditures and a low degree of employment protection (Hofstede, 2001; OECD, 
1999; Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik and Reynolds, 2005). Of these countries, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US also have high population growth and 
high immigration rates. Fourth, a group of five Western European countries in our 
sample (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland) are somewhat 
of a mixed story. A common denominator in these countries might be a traditionally 
strong small business sector (‘Mittelstand’) not matched by a high level of dynamics 
in recent years. Although all these countries have a relatively high per capita income, 
the latter three countries are below ‘equilibrium’ while Belgium and the Netherlands 
are above it. Finally, Luxembourg, France and Japan seem to be separate cases, 
although the business ownership rate in all three countries has been continuously 
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dropping. Luxembourg, with its distinctive industrial structure (banking, steel), now 
has the lowest business ownership rate in our sample (5.3%). France, which remains 
slightly below ‘equilibrium’, is characterized by high uncertainty avoidance and 
power distance (Hofstede, 2001; Wennekers, Thurik, van Stel and Noorderhaven, 
2007), by limited labour market flexibility and by centralized planning and control 
(Henriquez, Verheul, van der Geest and Bisschof, 2002; Groenewegen, 1991, 2000). 
Business ownership in Japan has followed the ‘equilibrium’ rate rather closely. The 
share of business owners in the labour force has been traditionally high in Japan 
through the protection of small firms in retailing and other sectors (van Stel, Thurik, 
Verheul and Baljeu, 2005; Harada, 2005; Masuda, 2006). These inefficient firms have 
only slowly started to disappear from the Japanese economy (Carree, Potjes and 
Thurik, 1993).  
The third question of interest is the one-sided penalty for economic growth found 
regarding deviations from the ‘equilibrium’ business ownership rate. The main 
conclusion seems to be that particularly a business ownership rate below 
‘equilibrium’ is harmful for economic growth. This would imply that it might be wise 
to err on the high side. For highly developed countries stimulating entrepreneurship 
may be a ‘no regret policy’. 
 
References 
Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B. and Evans, D.S. (1994) The determinants of variation in 
the self-employment rates across countries and over time, Discussion paper 
DP871, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
Amorós, J.E. (2006) Entrepreneurship dynamics and competitiveness in Latin 
America, Papers on entrepreneurship #03, Santiago, Chile: Universidad del 
Desarrollo. 
Audretsch, D.B., Carree, M.A., Van Stel, A.J. and Thurik, A.R. (2002) Impeded 
industrial restructuring: the growth penalty, Kyklos, 55(1): 81-97. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Thurik, A.R. (2001) What is new about the new economy: 
sources of growth in the managed and entrepreneurial economies, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 10(1): 267-315. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Thurik, A.R. (2004) A model of the entrepreneurial economy, 
International Journal of Entrepreneurship Education, 2(2): 143-166. 
Belso Martinez, J.A. (2005) Equilibrium entrepreneurship rate, economic 
development and growth. Evidence from Spanish regions, Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, 17: 145-161. 
 
 13 
Belussi, F. (1998) A framework of analysis for self-employment in Italy, paper 
presented at the OECD International Conference on Self-Employment, September 
1998, Burlington, Canada. 
Blau, D. (1987) A time series analysis of self-employment, Journal of Political 
Economy, 95(3): 445-467. 
Carree, M.A., Potjes, J.C.A. and Thurik, A.R. (1993) Small store presence in Japan, 
Economics Letters, 41, 329-334. 
Carree, M., Van Stel, A., Thurik, R. and Wennekers, S. (2002) Economic 
development and business ownership: an analysis using data of 23 OECD 
countries in the period 1976-1996, Small Business Economics, 19(3): 271-290. 
Chandler, A.D. Jr. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
Freytag, A. and Thurik, A.R. (2007) Entrepreneurship and its determinants in a cross-
country setting, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 17(2): forthcoming. 
Grilo, I. and Irigoyen, J-M. (2006) Entrepreneurship in the EU: to wish and not to be, 
Small Business Economics, 26(4): 305-318.  
Groenewegen, J. (1991) Indicatieve en regionale planning in Frankrijk, Geografisch 
Tijdschrift, 15(3): 228-236. 
Groenewegen, J. (2000) European integration and changing corporate governance 
structures: the case of France, Journal of Economic Issues, 34 (2): 471-479. 
Harada N. (2005) Potential entrepreneurship in Japan, Small Business Economics, 
25(3): 293-304. 
Henrekson, M. (2005) Entrepreneurship: a weak link in the welfare state? Industrial 
and Corporate Change 14(3): 437-467. 
Henriquez, C., Verheul, I., van der Geest, I. and Bisschof, C. (2002) Determinants of 
entrepreneurship in France. In Audretsch, D.B., Thurik, A.R., Verheul I. and 
Wennekers S. (eds) Entrepreneurship: Determinants and Policy in a European-
US Comparison, in. Boston/Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Hofstede, G. (2001) Culture's Consequences; Comparing Values, Behaviors, 
Institutions and Organizations Across Nations, Second edition. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
Iyigun, M.F. and Owen, A.L. (1998) Risk, entrepreneurship and human capital 
accumulation, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 88(2): 454-
457. 
Jensen, M.C. (1993) The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal 
control systems, Journal of Finance, 48(3): 831-880. 
Kuznets, S. (1971) Economic Growth of Nations, Total Output and Production 
Structure. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press / Belknapp Press. 
 14 
Masuda, T. (2006) The determinants of latent entrepreneurship in Japan, Small 
Business Economics, 26(3): 227-240. 
Muehlberger, U. and Pasqua, S. (2006) The “continuous collaborators” in Italy: 
hybrids between employment and self-employment? CHILD Working Paper n. 
10/2006, University of Torino. 
Noorderhaven, N., Thurik, R., Wennekers, S. and van Stel, A. (2004) The role of 
dissatisfaction and per capita income in explaining self-employment across 15 
European countries, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 28(5): 447-466. 
OECD (1999) Employment Outlook, Paris. 
Piore, M.J. and Sable, C.F. (1984) The Second Industrial Divide Possibilities for 
Prosperity. New York: Basic Books. 
Schultz, T.P. (1990) Women’s changing participation in the labor force: a world 
perspective, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38(3): 457-488. 
Teece, D.J. (1993) The dynamics of industrial capitalism: perspectives on Alfred 
Chandler’s scale and scope, Journal of Economic Literature, 31(1): 199-225. 
Thurik, A.R., Carree, M.A., van Stel, A.J. and Audretsch, D.B. (2007) Does self-
employment reduce unemployment? submitted to Journal of Business Venturing. 
Van Stel, A. (2005) COMPENDIA: harmonizing business ownership data across 
countries and over time, International Entrepreneurship and Management 
Journal, 1(1): 105-123. 
Van Stel, A., Carree, M. and Thurik, R. (2005) The effect of entrepreneurial activity 
on national economic growth, Small Business Economics, 24(3): 311-321. 
Van Stel, A., Thurik, R., Verheul I. and Baljeu, L. (2005) The contribution of 
business ownership in bringing down unemployment in Japan, Discussion papers 
on entrepreneurship, growth and public policy #0506, Jena: Max Planck Institute 
of Economics. 
Verheul, I., Van Stel, A. and Thurik, A.R. (2006) Explaining female and male 
entrepreneurship at the country level, Entrepreneurship and Regional 
Development, 18(2): 151-183. 
Wennekers, S., Van Stel, A., R. Thurik and Reynolds, P. (2005) Nascent 
entrepreneurship and the level of economic development, Small Business 
Economics, 24(3): 293-309. 
Wennekers, S. (2006) Entrepreneurship at Country Level; Economic and Non-
Economic Determinants, Rotterdam: ERIM. 
Wennekers, S., Thurik, R., van Stel, A. and Noorderhaven, N. (2007) Uncertainty 
avoidance and the rate of business ownership across 23 OECD countries, 1976-
2004, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 17(2): forthcoming. 
 15 
Yamada, G. (1996) Urban informal employment and self-employment in developing 
countries: theory and evidence, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
44(2): 289-314. 
